From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: TREATING RAND COMMITMENTS NEUTRALLY “Einer Elhauge (Harvard) suggests TREATING RAND COMMITMENTS NEUTRALLY. ABSTRACT: This article argues that the same legal standards should apply to RAND commitments whether they are made to standard-setting organizations or not. The arguments for concluding that RAND commitments should limit…” This is Commentary Elsewhere, from writers around the web. Please note the explanation of this section on the “About the Site” page.
From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU “Nicolas Petit, University of Liege – School of Law describes Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU. ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the 2014 Intel judgment of the General Court of the EU in relation to exclusivity rebates…” This is Commentary Elsewhere, from writers around the web. Please note the explanation of this section on the “About the Site” page.
From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions “Greg Sidak (Criterion) discusses The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions. ABSTRACT: Under what conditions may the holder of standard-essential patents (SEPs) seek to enjoin an infringing implementer without breaching the SEP holder’s contract with the standard-setting organization (SSO) to…” This is Commentary Elsewhere, from writers around the web. Please note the explanation of this section on the “About the Site” page.
From Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law “Daniel Petzold, Gleiss Lutz explains It Is All Predatory Pricing: Margin Squeeze Abuse and the Concept of Opportunity Costs in EU Competition Law. ABSTRACT: Margin squeeze as a stand-alone category of abuse of dominant position appears to be redundant. The…” This is Commentary Elsewhere, from writers around the web. Please note the explanation of this section on the “About the Site” page.
