TOWARD AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO AGENCY AGREEMENTS
“” via Journal of Competition Law and Economics – Advance Access: TOWARD AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO AGENCY AGREEMENTS
“” via Journal of Competition Law and Economics – Advance Access: TOWARD AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO AGENCY AGREEMENTS
“Posted by D. Daniel Sokol Mariateresa Maggiolino, Bocconi University asks Should We Believe in the Reassuring Nature of the Chicagoan Notion of Competition Law? ABSTRACT: If we wonder about the reasons why current antitrust scholars would like to resist the…” via Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: Should We Believe in the Reassuring Nature of the Chicagoan Notion of Competition Law?
“Posted by D. Daniel Sokol Roman Inderst, University of Frankfurt; Imperial College London Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, IESEG School of Management, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; Lille – Economics & Management (LEM) – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Organisation…” via Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog: Umbrella Effects
The U.S. Department of Justice’s recent suit to block an $11 billion merger between American Airlines Inc. and U.S. Airways Group Inc. has more in common with the agency’s 2011 challenge to AT&T Inc.’s $39 billion tie-up with T-Mobile USA Inc. than its balmy August filing date and the word “carrier.” via Law360: Competition: DOJ’s Airline Merger Challenge Recalls AT&T Fight